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Abstract
In this paper we look at global infl ation trends over the last decade and try to disentangle 
factors that could explain the ultra-low levels of infl ation during the recovery from the Great 
Recession. We review the literature on the subject, which points at possible structural shifts 
in price and wage setting processes in recent decades, such as infl ation’s reduced cyclical 
sensitivity to domestic economic slack, a bigger role being played by forward-looking 
infl ation expectations, and the increased importance of global factors. We then test 
empirically whether changes in the coeffi cients of the Phillips curve in the wake of the global 
fi nancial crisis can explain the behaviour of infl ation over this period for a large group of 
advanced economies. Our results show a wide range of variation between countries, and 
in some cases the fi ndings are insuffi ciently robust to offer a satisfactory explanation of 
the recent course of infl ation. Nevertheless, the persistence of infl ation and the increased 
importance of backward-looking infl ation expectations in some countries may pose risks for 
infl ation-expectation anchoring and central bank credibility. Finally, we review the adverse 
effects on the real economy of ultra-low infl ation over an extended period and analyse the 
policy options for addressing this problem. 
Keywords: infl ation, infl ation expectations, Phillips curve, monetary policy.
JEL classifi cation: E31, E32, E50.
Resumen
En este documento se ofrece una panorámica de la evolución de la infl ación a escala 
global en la última década y se trata de descubrir qué factores podrían explicar los niveles 
muy bajos de infl ación durante la recuperación de la Gran Recesión. Se hace una revisión 
de la literatura que apunta a posibles cambios estructurales en el proceso de fi jación de 
precios y salarios en décadas recientes, tales como la menor sensibilidad cíclica de la 
infl ación a la holgura económica interna, la mayor relevancia del componente prospectivo 
de las expectativas de infl ación o la mayor importancia de factores globales. Posteriormente 
se analiza empíricamente si cambios en los coefi cientes de la curva de Phillips tras la 
crisis fi nanciera global pueden explicar el comportamiento de la infl ación en las principales 
economías avanzadas en este período. Los resultados muestran un amplio grado de 
heterogeneidad entre países, y en algunos casos no son sufi cientemente robustos como 
para ofrecer una explicación satisfactoria. No obstante, en algunos países la persistencia 
de la infl ación y la mayor importancia del componente retrospectivo de las expectativas de 
infl ación puede plantear riesgos para el anclaje de las expectativas de infl ación y para la 
credibilidad de los bancos centrales. Por último, se repasan los efectos adversos de tasas 
muy bajas de infl ación durante un tiempo prolongado para la economía real y se analizan 
las opciones de política económica para resolver este problema.
Palabras claves: infl ación, expectativas de infl ación, precios, salarios, curva de Phillips, 
política monetaria.
Códigos JEL: E31, E32, E50.
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1 Introduction
Over the past fi ve years the world has witnessed an almost universal trend towards lower infl ation 
rates, with rates often falling short of central bank targets. The decline steepened in mid-2014 
with the oil-price slump, when infl ation rates in the main advanced economies fell to extremely 
low – and in some cases negative – levels. This downward trend in infl ation, apparently at odds 
with the context of economic recovery and highly expansionary monetary policies, followed a 
period in the immediate wake of the global fi nancial crisis in which infl ation proved surprisingly 
downwardly rigid and fell by less than expected, given the depth of the recession (the so-called 
“missing disinfl ation” puzzle). These developments have led to a search for the reasons why 
consumer prices should be behaving in this way. 
One possible explanation is that the course of infl ation has been closely linked to 
transitory factors, such as commodity prices, which have made a strongly negative contribution 
over the past two years. However, the drop in infl ation is also apparent in core rates, where 
these more volatile factors ought to have less of an effect. Other alternative explanations have 
therefore been put forward that point to changes in the price formation process over the last 
few decades that are more structural in nature. Indeed, the economic literature has suggested 
the possibility that, at least in many advanced economies, the cyclical sensitivity of infl ation (i.e. 
its response to the degree of economic slack in the economy) fell in the period up to the early 
1990s, while the relative importance of the anchoring of economic agents’ infl ation expectations 
to central bank targets rose, thanks to the greater credibility they had achieved. At the same 
time, global factors became more important, as a result of the integration of world product and 
factor markets, lower production costs and increased international competition (all of which is 
refl ected in infl ation’s heightened sensitivity to the degree of slack in the global economy).
Whatever the reason for unusually low levels of infl ation, they can have harmful 
consequences for economies. For instance, low infl ation rates tend to lead to higher real interest 
rates, and, therefore, tighter monetary conditions. Moreover, low infl ation has a negative impact 
on public and private debt dynamics, making deleveraging harder in the most indebted countries, 
and making it more diffi cult for countries in a monetary union to restore competitiveness, thus 
forcing them to undergo internal devaluation. In the extreme case, there can be a de-anchoring 
of agents’ infl ation expectations, with the consequent risk of a defl ationary spiral. Sub-target 
infl ation can also have a negative impact on central banks’ credibility.
This paper starts with an overview of how infl ation has progressed worldwide in recent 
years, distinguishing its behaviour in different geographical areas. It then examines the possible 
factors explaining this price behaviour, through a comprehensive review of the extensive literature 
on the topic and an empirical analysis examining various countries and periods. The possible 
economic consequences of ultra-low infl ation rates are then discussed, along with the associated 
economic policy implications. The paper ends with some concluding remarks.
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2 Global inflation trends
Global infl ation has fl uctuated widely over the past ten years.1 After climbing above 5% prior 
to the global fi nancial crisis, as a consequence, in part, of strong commodity (mainly energy) 
prices, it declined sharply after the crisis to levels close to 0%. It began to gradually recover in 
mid-2009, and had reached 4% by mid-2011. Since then, however, global infl ation has again 
been on a downward trend, dropping to approximately 1% at the end of 2015 before slowly 
increasing to 1.6% in the third quarter of 2016. Global core infl ation – which excludes energy 
and unprocessed food prices, the most erratic components directly infl uenced by factors such 
as the weather – decreased from 3.4% to 1.2% during the crisis and, after a partial rebound, has 
again moderated in recent years, declining from 2.7% in mid-2011 to a minimum of 1.3% in the 
second half of 2015 and now stands at 2% (Chart 1). 
1  The global infl ation rate has been constructed from a sample of 27 countries, representing 80% of global GDP.
SOURCES: National statistics, OECD and own calculations.
a Includes: Canada, Euro area, Japan, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and United States (advanced economies); and Brazil, Chile, China, Czech 
Republic, Hong kong SAR, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Russia, Singapur, South Africa, Thailand, and Turkey 
(emerging economies).
b "NQDHMk@SHNMDWBKTCDRENNC@MCDMDQFX
c First and third quartile.
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Over the last fi ve years, headline infl ation in advanced economies (which had recorded 
negative rates during the crisis) dropped from a median rate of 3% to 0.5%, while in emerging 
market economies, it declined from 4.7% to 2.7%. Core infl ation rates also fell in advanced 
economies in the wake of the crisis, dropping from 2% to 0.6%, although this drop was less than 
would have been expected given the depth of the recession. Subsequently core infl ation rose to 
1.9% at the end of 2011, and then declined again, hovering around 1% before gradually picking 
up, to reach 1.6% in June 2016. In emerging market economies core infl ation has also come 
down from 3.4% in mid-2011 to 1.7% at present, contrary to what might have been expected 
according to the Balassa-Samuelson hypothesis. Prices of industrial goods have tended to 
decline over the last two years, linked through the prices of imported goods, while services 
infl ation has tended to remain higher. 
Looking at the different countries in the most recent period, infl ation rates have been on 
a downward trend in the main advanced economies over the last fi ve years (Chart 2). Headline 
infl ation in the United States dropped from almost 4% in mid-2011 to close to 0% in the fi rst few 
months of 2015, remaining close to that level for most of the year and gradually picking up towards 
1% by mid-2016. In the euro area, where the economy has been more sluggish, infl ation fell from 
3% in late 2011 to –0.7% at the beginning of 2015, while for the last twelve months it has hovered 
around 0%. Even in the United Kingdom, where infl ation rates remained relatively high in the wake 
of the crisis, partly as a result of the depreciation of sterling, infl ation dropped from 5% at the end of 
2011 to rates close to zero during 2015, rising to around 0.5% in mid-2016. In the case of Japan, 
price trends have been driven by changes in economic policy in recent years (including the Bank 
of Japan’s new infl ation target and quantitative easing, and a consumption-tax increase),2 such 
that the infl ation rate rose from close to 0% to 2.5% in mid-2014, although it has subsequently 
dropped back to around 0% since mid-2015, reaching negative values in mid-2016. The trend 
in core infl ation has been fairly similar, at somewhat higher levels but falling short of central 
bank targets; only in the United States has it recently climbed above the 2% target. 
In some smaller advanced economies, such as Denmark, Sweden and Switzerland, 
infl ation rates also moved into negative territory. These are small, open European economies, 
which have received large capital infl ows as a result of spillovers from euro area problems and 
the ECB’s low interest rates. In Denmark and Switzerland this has been exacerbated by their 
exchange rates’ links to the euro. These countries have had to resort to negative policy rates and 
currency market interventions to stem the upward pressure on their currencies. Other advanced 
economies, such as Australia, Canada and New Zealand, have also experienced low infl ation 
rates that have fallen short of their central banks’ infl ation targets. In the case of these commodity 
exporting countries, lower commodity prices have negatively affected their income levels.
2   Changes in indirect taxes and administered prices have also made a big contribution to changes in infl ation in other 
regions, with an impact on their apparently limited response to cyclical changes in the economy. In a number of euro 
area countries, for example, fi scal systems were reformed before the crisis to give indirect taxes a more central role, 
and if the impact of these tax increases is removed then infl ation is seen to respond more strongly to the economic 
slowdown. For an analysis of recent experience in Spain, see the box “Una evaluación preliminar del efecto sobre la 
infl ación de los aumentos en la imposición indirecta y en los precios administrados” in the Banco de España’s Boletín 
Económico (October 2012).
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The trends in headline infl ation rates in emerging economies have been more varied. 
Thus, while in some cases rates have been very low (particularly in the new EU Member States 
in Eastern Europe, and some emerging Asian economies, such as China and Korea), in some 
of the main emerging economies, such as Brazil, India, Indonesia, Russia and Turkey, infl ation 
rates have remained high, fuelled by currency depreciation. The same trends are apparent in 
core infl ation, with very low levels in Asia and emerging European economies, and higher rates 
in Latin America and other emerging economies such as Russia and Turkey. Since 2011 the 
distribution of infl ation rates worldwide has shifted downwards markedly (Chart 3). Out of 26 
advanced and emerging economies, only in seven was the infl ation rate higher in July 2016 than 
in June 2011 – basically, emerging economies whose currencies had depreciated. And in many 
countries infl ation rates are below the targets set by their central banks (Chart 4). Similarly, there 
have been systematic downside errors in analysts’ and central banks’ infl ation forecasts.
SOURCES: Datastream, national statistics, OECD and own calculations.
a Weighted average of each country in 2005 by GDP in PPP.
b "NQDHMk@SHNMDWBKTCDRENNC@MCDMDQFX
c China, Hong Kong SAR, India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapur and Thailand.
d !Q@YHK"GHKD"NKNLAH@,DWHBN@MC/DQT
e Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland.
f South Africa, Turkey and Russia.
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SOURCES: Datastream, national statistics, OECD, own calculation.
a Sample of 27 countries: Canada, the Euro Area, Japan, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and United States (advanced) and Brazil, Chile, China, 
Czech Republic, Hong Kong SAR, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Peru, Russia, the Philippines, Poland, Singapore, South Africa, Thailand 
and Turkey (emerging). Data is the average of the period.
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3 Determinants of low global inflation
The standard framework for modelling infl ation is the Phillips curve, according to which infl ation 
is basically determined by economic agents’ infl ation expectations, which may comprise both 
backward- and forward-looking components. It is also affected by the degree of cyclical slack 
in the economy, so that a negative output gap (i.e. GDP below its potential level) or cyclical 
unemployment (defi ned as the extent to which the unemployment rate differs from its structural 
rate) will be associated with a lower infl ation rate. Within this framework, low infl ation could basically 
be explained by greater slack in the economy and/or by agents’ lower infl ation expectations.3 
However, the Phillips-curve-based analysis has its limitations and remains controversial 
among economists [see, for example, ECB (2014), Constâncio (2015) or Yellen (2015)]. To start 
with, the degree of slack in the economy cannot be directly observed. Instead, various measures 
are used as proxies and, in exceptional circumstances, such as the global fi nancial crisis, it 
is surrounded by higher uncertainty. Moreover, the empirical evidence shows that, at least in 
advanced economies, there were changes in the parameters of the Phillips curve between the 
1970s and the early 1990s. First, in that period infl ation became less sensitive to the cyclical 
situation of the economy (in terms of the Phillips curve, the curve fl attened), although this sensitivity 
seems to have remained stable since then, not having diminished further during the crisis. Indeed, 
some studies have found it to have increased in recent years in some countries.4 Second, some 
authors have also asserted that, as a consequence of the process of globalisation, infl ation today 
depends less on each economy’s cyclical position and more on the degree of slack in the global 
economy [a point of view stressed by the BIS; see for example Borio and Filardo (2007), White 
(2008) and BIS (2014, 2015)]. Finally, other possible changes in the parameters of the Phillips 
curve have been highlighted, such as the fact that the infl ation-expectations coeffi cient has risen 
as a result of central banks’ greater credibility. 
Additionally, the theoretical framework of the Phillips curve has sometimes been 
supplemented with other factors, which could play a signifi cant role in price determination. 
These include supply shocks (affecting productivity or commodity prices, for example), labour 
market institutions, and the effects of exchange rates, indirect tax rates or demographic shifts.5 
This model, commonly known as the triangular model because it captures the effects of 
3   Under this framework (see the formula below) infl ation (π t ) would be determined by infl ation expectations – possibly a 
combination of forward looking (LT t ) and backward looking elements ( π’ t  ) – and by the degree of cyclical slack in the 
economy (slack t ) : 
π t = LT t + (1 – ) π’ t +  1 slack t +  t        
4  See, for example, Stella and Stock (2013) for the case of the United States.
5   A number of authors point to the defl ationary effect of population ageing, particularly in the case of Japan, due primarily 
to the negative effect on economic growth and natural interest rates [Shirakawa (2012), Anderson (2014), Carvalho and 
Ferrero (2014)]. For a more general discussion of the effects of ageing, see, for example, Bean (2004), Bullard et al. 
(2012), Imam (2013) or Yoon et al. (2014); these authors point to the greater preference of longer-lived generations for 
low infl ation, as their income is mainly fi xed, and their lower sensitivity to monetary policy. By contrast, McMillan and 
Baesel (1990), Lindh and Malmberg (2000) and Juselius and Takáts (2015) fi nd a positive correlation between the ratio 
of dependent population (young and elderly people) and a high infl ation rate.
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shifts in demand, supply and expectations, has been used by Gordon (1982, 2011, 2013), in 
particular. In the remainder of this section we explore how these factors have evolved and 
we undertake a comprehensive review of the extensive theoretical and empirical literature on 
the topic. The section concludes with an empirical exercise exploring the infl uence of each 
factor on infl ation in advanced economies before and after the crisis. 
3.1 The effect of commodity prices and exchange rates 
The way the main components of infl ation have developed reveals that trends in commodity 
prices, particularly the oil price, have been among the main factors pushing down infl ation 
worldwide (Table 1 and Chart 5). The contribution of the oil price to global infl ation has been 
shrinking since 2011 and has been negative since 2014.6 Food prices have also fl uctuated widely, 
contributing to the recent drop in infl ation rates, particularly in emerging economies, where they 
account for a larger share of the basket of consumer goods [see Furceri, et al. (2015)]. Core 
infl ation, which excludes the energy and food components, has been somewhat more stable. As 
mentioned above, within core infl ation, goods and services have performed differently. Infl ation 
6   Bec and De Gaye (2014) fi nd that a large share of infl ation forecasting errors in recent years in the United States and 
France are due to errors predicting the oil price.
SOURCES: Datastream, national statistics, OECD, Eurostat own calculations.
a For CPI energy, food and core columns, it is the variation of its contribution in the period. Japan data excludes the VAT 
effect.
pp
Advanced Economies
  United States -1.2 -0.3 0.5 -1.1
  Euro Area -0.7 0.2 0.4 -0.2
  Japan (a) -1.7 -0.3 0.2 -1.8
  Norway 1.6 0.0 0.6 2.1
  Canada -1.1 -0.2 0.5 -0.9
  Sweden 0.2 0.1 0.7 1.1
  Switzerland -0.4 0.0 0.2 -0.2
  United Kingdom -0.6 -0.3 -0.1 -1.0
Emerging Economies
3.28.01.14.0lizarB  
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  Mexico -0.9 0.0 -0.5 -1.4
9.0-3.03.0-0.1-aeroK  
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CONTRIBUTIONS TO CHANGE IN INFLATION (a)
(Difference between Jun-16 and June-14)
TABLE 1
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rates for goods, more directly linked to import prices, have tended to be negative over the 
last two years, whereas rates for services have remained higher. In some cases, such as the 
United States, the moderation of services infl ation is also surprising when compared to previous 
recoveries, although this could refl ect the moderation of health-care prices, after the country’s 
recent health-care legislation. 
The direct effects of falling oil prices have varied between countries as a result of 
differences in oil’s weight in the CPI, different levels of taxation on energy (usually in the form of 
unit tax rates), and changes in energy taxes and subsidies, as well as fl uctuations in exchange 
rates [see IMF (2008)]. For example, oil prices have fallen by more in dollar than in euro terms, 
and less in other currencies that have depreciated against the dollar over the period. Similarly, 
the drop in the energy component of the CPI in the EU was smaller than in the United States, 
as a result of higher tax levels in Europe.7 In some emerging economies, such as Brazil and 
Indonesia, subsidy cuts caused an effective rise in fuel prices despite lower oil prices. 
Another important point to consider when analysing the impact of falling commodity 
prices on infl ation is whether the decline is being driven by supply- or demand-side factors. This 
is because the effects of a drop in the oil price caused by supply-side factors would be partially 
offset by the accompanying stimulus to activity, whereas a price drop driven by weak demand 
could have a bigger defl ationary effect. 
Finally, the impact of oil and other commodity prices on infl ation, beyond the direct and 
indirect effects on production costs, will depend on how long the underlying shocks last. Thus, 
the likelihood of second-round effects on prices and wages will be greater if these shocks are 
persistent rather than short-lived. In this regard, there is extensive evidence that the degree of 
pass-through of commodity prices to core infl ation has diminished over the past three decades. 
This is partly because the economy today makes less intensive use of commodities and also 
7   However, Álvarez et al. (2011) show that both in Spain and the euro area as a whole the direct impact of the oil price on 
infl ation has increased over the last decade as a consequence of the increased weight of refi ned petroleum products 
in the consumption basket.
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because the monetary authorities have gained credibility, which enables them to anchor infl ation 
expectations more fi rmly. An additional factor is that wage indexing is less widespread.8 In the 
today’s context, unless commodity prices continue to fall over the next few years, something not 
discounted by markets, the negative impacts on infl ation can be expected to dissipate and are not 
likely to have signifi cant second-round effects. However, the relative importance of demand from 
the emerging economies [in particular, China) in determining commodity prices has increased over 
time (see Roache (2012)] and events in large emerging economies (such as a possible slowdown 
in China while it makes the transition to a less investment- and more consumption-based model) 
may have a powerful impact on commodity prices over the next few years. 
A large share of how infl ation has developed in some countries can be explained by 
shifts in exchange rates. This is easy to confi rm in the case of economies where a substantial 
depreciation in their currency has been linked to a subsequent rise in infl ation. This was the case 
in Japan, following the launch of Abenomics, the United Kingdom, following the depreciation 
of the pound in the wake of the crisis, and certain emerging economies confronted with the 
prospect of monetary policy tightening in the United States [see, for example, Vergara (2015)]. By 
contrast, countries whose currencies have appreciated, such as Switzerland, the United States, 
China or, more recently, Japan, have experienced defl ationary pressures via this route [see, for 
example, Fischer (2015), Jordan (2015) or Yellen (2015)]. This would explain why infl ation has 
varied so widely around the world, as shown by the negative correlation between infl ation rates 
and changes in nominal effective exchange rates in recent years (Chart 6). 
Nevertheless, as in the case of commodity prices, there is evidence that the exchange 
rate pass-through into infl ation has decreased in recent decades. This has been particularly the 
case in the advanced economies, as well as in some emerging economies9, as a consequence 
of several factors, such as the better anchoring of infl ation expectations, the development of 
global production chains that enable better absorption of exchange rate shifts by multinationals 
fi rms, the greater depth and liquidity of derivative markets, etc.10
In any event, the low levels of infl ation recorded in recent years cannot be explained 
solely by relatively transitory movements of volatile variables, such as exchange rates, 
commodity prices, or indirect taxes. This raises the question of whether other factors have 
8    See, for example, Hooker (2002), de Gregorio et al. (2007), Cecchetti and Moessner (2008), IMF (2008), Blanchard 
and Galí (2010), Clark and Terry (2010), Álvarez et al. (2011), Evans and Fisher (2011), Davis (2012), BIS (2015), Furceri 
et al. (2015). 
9    See, for example, Campa and Goldberg (2005, 2008), Campa et al. (2007), Bailliu et al. (2010), Kohlscheen (2010), 
Takhtamanova (2010), Gagnon et al. (2012), BIS (2014). Gopinath (2015) highlights, in the US case, the predominance 
of dollar-denominated imports as being a key factor in the reduced pass-through of the exchange rate into infl ation. 
Factors such as exporters’ pricing to market makes the extent of pass-through of exchange rate movements into 
import prices incomplete [see, for example, Bank of England (2015)].
10   For a contrasting opinion, see Hara et al. (2015) for the case of Japan since the 2000s. Moreover, Forbes (2015) and 
Forbes et al. (2015) also fi nd that pass-through in the United Kingdom increased in the wake of the crisis. Furthermore, 
they highlight that to explain how this pass-through has evolved it is essential to distinguish the origin of the change in 
the exchange rate (i.e. whether it is due to domestic demand, global demand, domestic monetary policy, global supply 
shocks, domestic productivity, etc.). The largest degree of pass-through is found if the rise in the exchange rate is due 
to supply-side shocks, particularly domestic ones, while rising exchange rates linked to global or domestic demand 
shocks can cause price rises. The ECB’s MPC Task Force on Low Infl ation Report reached similar conclusions. 
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played a signifi cant role in the price-formation process. The following sections examine some of 
these possible factors, from a theoretical viewpoint based on the Phillips curve.
3.2 Cyclical sensitivity of inflation
A high degree of economic slack is typically a driver of low infl ation. However, measuring this slack 
is complicated by the diffi culty of estimating potential GDP and the output gap. This measurement 
problem was exacerbated in the post-fi nancial crisis global economic context. Although it seems 
clear that the fi nancial crisis has substantially reduced potential GDP (and possibly potential growth 
as well), the precise extent to which it has done so is less clear. Indeed, potential growth prior to the 
crisis may have been overestimated as it was achieved by generating macro-fi nancial imbalances 
that made it unsustainable, particularly in those advanced economies worst hit by the crisis 
[recent work on this line of research includes that by Alberola, et al. (2014) and Borio et al. (2013, 
2014)].11 There are also uncertainties about the point in the economic cycle reached by emerging 
economies. Insofar as part of these economies’ growth in recent years is explained by strong 
capital infl ows, credit booms and, in some cases, high commodity prices, potential GDP growth is 
likely to be lower now than previously estimated. Indeed, the main international organisations have 
cut their long term growth estimates for both the advanced and emerging economies. 
An alternative to using the output gap as a measure of the cyclical position of the economy 
is to use the unemployment rate. However, identifying the cyclical and structural components of 
the unemployment rate is far from straightforward. The conceptual and practical diffi culties in 
11   This situation is very different from that in the second half of the 1990s, when there was a tendency to predict 
higher infl ation than actually occurred in the advanced economies. Then, however, the technology revolution boosted 
productivity and potential growth, allowing greater slack and reducing infl ationary pressures [see, for example, 
Andersen and Wascher (2001), Ihrig and Marquez (2003)]. 
SOURCES: Datastream, national statistics, BIS Annual Report (2015).
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estimating NAIRU are analogous to those affecting potential GDP estimates [see, for example, 
Staiger et al. (1997)]. Moreover, changes in other labour market variables can give a different view of 
the degree of economic slack. For example, in the United States, some of the fundamental labour 
market variables, such as participation rates, unemployment rates, and long-term unemployment 
rates, have behaved in recent years in ways not in keeping with historical trends. At the same time, 
shifts in some statistical relationships that had remained stable over recent decades, such as the 
Beveridge curve (the relationship between the job-vacancy and unemployment rates) or Okun’s 
law (the relationship between GDP growth and the unemployment rate) have become apparent. 
These shifts suggest the possible existence of structural changes in the labour market and/or in the 
relationships between the underlying economic variables. This has increased the uncertainty as to 
whether the unemployment rate is an accurate measure of the economy’s idle capacity, especially 
when it has been close to what is considered the natural rate of unemployment and no wage 
pressure has been detected. In particular, it is not clear whether the natural rate of unemployment 
has changed, and if so, by how much. Moreover, it is unclear whether the unusual drop in the 
participation rate is partially reversible, and if so, to what extent. There is also uncertainty as to 
whether long-term unemployment is exhibiting hysteresis, a phenomenon that had been observed 
previously in other advanced economies, but not in the United States.12 
All these uncertainties raise some diffi cult questions. Should economic slack be 
measured via GDP or unemployment? Should deviations from equilibrium levels or growth rates 
of the variables [as proposed by Orphanides and Van Norden (2005)] be taken into account? 
Should fi nancial factors and other macro-fi nancial imbalances be incorporated in the output gap 
estimates? In any event, existing estimates by international organisations suggest that although 
output (and unemployment) gaps in the main advanced economies (Chart 7) are still signifi cant, 
in general the degree of economic slack has decreased over the last few years, despite the 
moderation of infl ation rates. Similarly, the wide output gaps that opened up in the aftermath of 
the crisis contrast with infl ation’s downward rigidity in that period [as highlighted, for example, by 
Ball and Mazumder (2011)],13 something that could be explained by the countercyclical behaviour 
of fi rms’ margins, reinforced by fi nancial constraints, as we will discuss below.
In any event, the fact that infl ation rates have not responded as expected to economies’ 
cyclical position in recent years is not something new. There is extensive empirical evidence in the 
literature showing that in advanced economies the Phillips curve fl attened between the 1970s 
and the early 1990s.14 Chart 8 shows the relationship between consumer price infl ation and the 
12   For a detailed analysis of recent trends in the US labour market, see Berganza (2014). Some authors have suggested 
that the long-term unemployed disconnect from the labour market and do not exert the same pressure on wages as 
the short-term unemployed [Llaudes (2005), Gordon (2013), Krueger et al. (2014), Kumar and Orrenius (2014), Linder 
et al. (2014), Ball and Mazumder (2015)]. For a contrary view, see Kiley (2014) or Speigner (2014).
13   Ball and Mazumder (2011) fi nd that according to traditional estimates of the Phillips curve core infl ation in the US 
should have declined well below zero during the crisis (even reaching less than -3%, although it actually just fell to 
0.6%). This contrasts with the historical evidence that pronounced and persistent negative output gaps tend to lead 
to signifi cant defl ation in terms of both prices and wages, as Meier (2010) shows.
14   See, for example, Bean (2006, 2007), Iakova (2007), Kuttner and Robinson (2008), Mishkin (2007), Razin and 
Binyamini (2007), IMF (2013), Matheson and Stavrev (2013), BIS (2014), Murphy (2014), Blanchard et al. (2015). The 
empirical evidence for emerging economies is limited, although a similar trend seems to have been observed (Baxa et 
al. (2012) for Eastern Europe). For a contrasting view see, for example, Stella and Stock (2013), who argue that the 
Phillips curve has become steeper in the United States since 2008.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 19 DOCUMENTO OCASIONAL N.º 1608
output gap and between wage infl ation and the cyclical component of the unemployment rate 
in different periods.15 The reduced sensitivity of infl ation to the degree of economic slack also 
means that it is much more diffi cult to predict infl ation precisely.16
15   For some authors, the Phillips curve presents non-linearities, being fl atter when unemployment rates are higher, due 
to downward wage rigidities, and steeper when unemployment rates are very low [Mourougane and Ibaragi (2004), 
de Veirman (2009), Linder et al (2012), Kumar and Orrenius (2014), Speigner (2014)]. Snower (2015) also considers 
the Phillips curve to be non-linear, with a positive slope segment (higher infl ation, higher unemployment) related to the 
phenomenon of stagfl ation. For a contrasting view, see Musso et al. (2009). In the case of the Spanish economy, a 
recent paper by Álvarez et al. (2015) found evidence that infl ation responds differently in booms than in recessions, 
being higher in the contractionary phases of the cycle. 
16   As indicated, for example, by Stock and Watson (1999, 2007, 2010), Atkeson and Ohanian (2001), Cecchetti et al. 
(2007) or Bánbura and Mirza (2013). 
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Another way of looking at the cyclical sensitivity of infl ation is through changes in 
the coeffi cient of the Phillips curve that captures the effect of the economy’s economic slack 
over time. A number of recent papers have shown that this parameter decreased in advanced 
economies between the 1970s and the 1990s, indicating a fl attening of the Phillips curve during 
this period.17 Nevertheless, there is also considerable evidence that this phenomenon has been 
reversed in some advanced economies in the wake of the crisis. For example, in some euro area 
countries, such as Spain, Finland and Italy,18 this has come about as a result of greater market 
fl exibility following a number of structural reforms.19 
Turning to developments in labour markets, wage growth in the United States in 
the last few years has been weaker than in previous recoveries given the declining trend in 
the unemployment rate, and even bearing in mind the low rates of infl ation. There could be 
various – not necessarily mutually compatible – reasons for this. First, as noted above, this 
wage behaviour could be a sign that the labour market conditions are actually weaker than the 
unemployment rate would suggest. However, the literature offers other possible reasons why 
wages have not risen more in some developed economies. For example, productivity gains in 
recent years have been low (a phenomenon also observed in other advanced economies). It 
could also be the case that productivity growth has been slow because wage growth has been 
slow; that is, faced with only tepid rises in labour costs, fi rms have had less incentive to invest 
in labour-saving technologies. 
Muted wage growth could also be related to the composition of employment. For 
example, in the United Kingdom less productive workers earning lower wages bore the brunt of 
job losses during the crisis and experienced fastest job growth during the recovery, which could 
explain the slow growth of both productivity and wages (Broadbent, 2015). This change in the 
composition of employment could be due to demand-side factors (less investment in physical 
and human capital in the wake of the crisis) or supply-side factors (increased immigration). 
Another explanation, which became popular following Yellen’s speech at Jackson Hole in 2014 
[Yellen (2014)], was the concept of pent-up wage defl ation developed by Daly and Hobjin (2014). 
Given workers’ reluctance to accept cuts in nominal wages during a recession and the start 
of a recovery,20 employees’ real wages would remain above equilibrium levels; consequently, 
unemployment may fall during the recovery, thereby reducing the slack in the labour market, 
without pushing up nominal wages. This phenomenon would be temporary, so that once real 
wages reach equilibrium levels (and the pent-up wage defl ation is absorbed) nominal wages 
should start rising again. This process may be abrupt, however.
17   See, for example, IMF (2006, 2013), Roberts (2006), Iakova (2007), Andrle et al. (2013), Coibion and Gorodnichenko 
(2013), Matheson and Stavrev (2013), Stevens (2013), BIS (2014), Broadbent (2014), Ball and Mazumder (2015), 
Blanchard et al. (2015), Galí (2015), Riggi and Santoro (2015).
18   See, for example, Álvarez and Urtasun (2013), Oinonen et al. (2013), Stella and Stock (2013), Jordan and Vilmi (2014), 
Larkin (2014), Oinonen and Paloviita (2014), Riggi and Venditti (2014), Álvarez et al. (2015), Banco de España (2015), 
Blanchard et al. (2015), Carney (2015), Constâncio (2015), Draghi (2015a), Fabiani and Porqueddu (2015), Riggi and 
Venditti (2015), IMF (2016b). 
19  For an analysis applied to the Spanish case, see Izquierdo and Puente (2015).
20  There is extensive evidence of these downward rigidities in nominal wages, even in the US case [see, for example, 
Benigno and Ricci (2011), Linder et al. (2012), Lopez-Perez (2015)].
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Another interesting feature of price determination related to the reduced cyclical 
sensitivity of infl ation is that in some advanced economies the close link between wage growth 
and CPI infl ation seems to have dissipated.21 As Chart 9 shows, in the US and UK economies 
this relationship was relatively tight in the 1970s and 1980s, whereas infl ation seems to have 
become relatively insensitive to wage fl uctuations since the 1990s. As mentioned above, one 
possible explanation for the looser relationship between wage growth and consumer price 
increases would be the existence of counter-cyclical mark-ups, such that infl ation has become 
less sensitive to labour-market conditions because mark-ups have offset the effect of wages. If 
this is the case, increased mark-ups in many economies since the Great Recession would have 
partially offset the disinfl ationary effect of declining wages, helping explain infl ation’s more muted 
response. This phenomenon would have intensifi ed in the aftermath of the fi nancial crisis, as the 
fi nancial constraints would reinforce the counter-cyclical trend in margins.22
Lastly, other possible explanations for infl ation’s potentially reduced cyclical sensitivity 
include the greater importance of global factors in determining prices or the effect of infl ation-
expectation anchoring. These issues will be addressed in the two following sections. 
3.3 Influence of global factors on inflation
Some of the same studies that fi nd infl ation to have become less sensitive to domestic cyclical 
conditions argue that, by contrast, the signifi cance of global factors has increased as a result of 
globalisation. This argument has been put forward in some BIS papers [see Borio and Filardo 
(2007) and White (2008)] and in BIS annual reports (2014, 2015). The estimates of the Phillips 
curve provided by these authors show the effects of variables such as the global output gap 
or import prices to be signifi cant, while that of the domestic output gap to be small or even 
21 See, for example, Mehra (2000), Peneva and Rudd (2015), Yellen (2015).
22  As put forward by Chevalier and Scharfstein (1996), Brayton et al. (1999) and, more recently, Gilchrist and Zakrajšek 
(2012, 2015), Gilchrist et al. (2015), Kimura (2013) and Montero and Urtasun (2014).
SOURCE: National statistics.
a Quaterly data.
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insignifi cant.23 A recent IMF study has also highlighted the relevance of global factors (measured 
by the industrial slack in large exporters such as Japan, the United States, and especially China) 
in explaining low infl ation by putting downward pressure on global prices of tradable goods 
(IMF, 2016b). This study shows that the decline in goods infl ation has been steeper than that in 
services, particularly in the case of tradable goods.
The process of globalisation has expanded the range of products and services that 
can be traded internationally. It has also led to tradable goods,24 particularly manufactured 
goods – but increasingly services too – becoming cheaper as a result of lower production costs 
in emerging economies, such as China, in particular.25 Increased globalisation also infl uences 
prices through heightened international competition in both product and factor markets.26 This 
competition also constrains workers’ bargaining power and business margins.27 At the same 
time, global supply and demand conditions determine commodity prices, which have a direct 
impact on infl ation.28 Strong growth in emerging economies – particularly China – in the years 
leading up to the crisis drove up prices of commodities, and this process has gone into reverse 
now these economies are slowing. 
In line with the increased importance of global factors, infl ation rates and wage growth 
have tended to be more closely synchronised among advanced economies in recent years and 
there is considerable evidence that a common factor, obtained empirically by principal component 
analysis, can explain a signifi cant portion of the variability of infl ation in advanced economies.29 
However, although it is accepted that global factors play a bigger role in determining infl ation, 
there is considerable uncertainty as to the real signifi cance of these factors in the recent drop in 
infl ation.30 And in the medium-to-long term, it is debatable to what extent globalisation will 
continue to exert a defl ationary effect, as differences in labour costs between countries shrink. 
23  Many studies seem to confi rm the increased relevance of global factors in infl ation. See, for example, (2006, 2013), 
Bean (2006, 2007), Razin and Binyamini (2007), Pain et al. (2008), Peacock and Baumann (2008), Ciccarelli and Mojón 
(2010), Eickmeier and Pijnenburg (2013), Matheson and Stavrev (2013), Stevens (2013), Ferroni and Mojón (2014), 
Friedrich (2014), Iossifov and Podpiera (2014), Medel et al. (2014), Friedrich and Gosselin (2015). 
24  See, for example, Gamber and Hung (2001) or Auer and Sauré (2013).
25  China’s defl ationary effect on the rest of the world has been highlighted, for example by Morimoto et al. (2003), ECB 
(2006), Kamin et al. (2006), Freeman (2007), Côté and de Resende (2008), Eickmeier and Kühnlenz (2013), Mandel 
(2013. For a contrasting view, see Feyzioğlu and Willard (2006).
26  Bentolila et al. (2007) highlight the importance of immigration in fl attening the Phillips curve in Spain between 1995 
and 2006.
27  These competitive effects have been pointed out by a number of authors, such as Chen et al. (2004), Bean (2006, 
2007), Guerrieri et al. (2008), Anderton et al. (2009); Sekine (2009), Auer and Fischer (2010); Benigno and Faia (2010), 
Auer et al. (2011), Mandel (2013), BIS (2015), Carney (2015), Figura and Ratner (2015), Guilloux-Nefussi (2015), Jordan 
(2015). For a contrasting view, see Sbordone (2007).
28  See, for example, Pain et al. (2008), Bernanke (2007), Greenslade et al. (2008), Galesi and Lombardi (2009), Draghi 
(2015b), Medel (2015). 
29  The evidence of greater synchronisation between infl ation rates in the advanced economies and the importance of 
common factors can be found in Cecchetti et al. (2007); Hakkio (2009), Monacelli and Sala (2009), Ciccarelli and Mojón 
(2010), Neely and Rapach (2011), Gerard (2012), BIS (2014), Ferroni and Mojón (2014), Gopinath (2015), Medel (2015). 
For a contrasting view, see Forster and Tillmann (2014). 
30   Many authors, while not denying that global factors have a bigger infl uence, have questioned the centrality of global 
effects in explaining the recent episode of low infl ation and the one prior to the global fi nancial crisis. They also question 
the supposed inability of monetary authorities to control infl ation for this reason. See, for example, Tootell (1998), Rogoff 
(2003, 2006), Ball (2006); Gnan and Valderrama (2006), Kohn (2006); Yellen (2006), Bernanke (2007), Mishkin (2008), Pain 
et al. (2008), Calza (2009), Gaiotti (2010), Galí (2010), Ihrig et al. (2010), Papademos (2010), Woodford (2010), Zaniboni 
(2011), Martínez-García and Wynne (2012), Bianchi and Civelli (2015), Carney (2015) or Mikolajun and Lodge (2016).
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3.4 The role of inflation expectations 
The other possible explanation given in the literature for infl ation’s reduced cyclical sensitivity 
is the stronger anchoring of agents’ infl ation expectations on central banks’ targets and the 
increased signifi cance of this factor in price and wage setting.31 If agents remain confi dent 
of central banks’ commitment to price stability, they will attach less importance to transient 
deviations in infl ation and cyclical pressures on infl ation will be more muted. The greater stability 
of infl ation in recent decades, and its reluctance to drop further during the fi nancial crisis, would 
be consistent with this hypothesis.32 Several studies showing how the parameters of the Phillips 
curve have evolved over time confi rm that the coeffi cient of infl ation expectations has risen over 
the past decades [IMF (2013), Blanchard et al. (2015)]. 
In this regard, it is particularly important that long-term infl ation expectations 
remain well anchored, given that short-term expectations tend to be more volatile and more 
responsive to changes in infl ation. As Yellen (2015) notes, the medium-term effect on infl ation 
of factors that are, in principle, transient (such as the amount of slack or energy prices) 
depends on whether long-term expectations are affected or not. In fact, in recent decades 
long-term expectations have remained much more stable and have barely been affected by 
changes in past infl ation. However, in the most recent recovery the downward trend in infl ation 
may have led to a drop in infl ation expectations in some regions, particularly in the euro area, 
but also in the United States and the United Kingdom.33 This is not just the case for short-term 
expectations but for medium- and long-term expectations too34 (see Chart 10). Indeed, this 
drop in infl ation expectations triggered a reaction of monetary authorities, as they became 
aware of the risks of infl ation expectations becoming unanchored and potentially leading to a 
defl ationary spiral.
In particular, there is some evidence that the correlation between actual infl ation and 
long-term expectations has become closer in advanced economies since the fi nancial crisis 
(particularly when measures of infl ation compensation obtained from fi nancial markets are 
used);35 the correlation with oil prices appears to have increased as well36 (see Chart 11). This is 
31  See, for example, Williams (2006), Mishkin (2007), Ball and Mazumder (2011), IMF (2013), Matheson and Stavrev (2013), 
Oinonen et al. (2013), Stevens (2013), BIS (2014), del Negro et al. (2014), Watson (2014), Ball (2015), Yellen (2015).
32  Particular importance is given to infl ation-targeting regimes in explaining the greater importance of infl ation expectations. 
See, for example, Levin et al. (2004), Gürkaynak et al. (2010), Davis (2014), Mehrotra and Yetman (2014) or Yetman 
(2015). For a recent contrasting view, see Kumar et al. (2015).
33  See, for example, ECB (2015), Domit and Jackson (2015), Miccoli and Neri (2015) or Yellen (2015). Ciccarelli and García 
(2015) fi nd signifi cant spillover effects since August 2014 from long-term infl ation in the euro area on expectations in other 
regions, particularly the United States. This could explain the way market expectations were seen to drop at the same time. 
34  See, for example, Antunes (2015), who fi nds that changes in short-term infl ation expectations in the euro area have 
translated into long-term expectations since mid-2012.
35   See, for example, Galati et al. (2011), BIS (2015), Miccoli and Neri (2015), IMF (2016b). Nevertheless, the limitations 
of measures of infl ation expectations derived from fi nancial instruments (such as the existence of liquidity premiums) 
must be borne in mind, while, by contrast, expectations reported in surveys have remained much more stable 
[Hördahl (2009), Bauer and McCarthy (2015), Yellen (2015)]. However, Lyziak and Paloviita (2016) fi nd that in the euro 
area longer-term infl ation expectations of professional forecasters and consumers have become somewhat more 
sensitive to shorter-term forecasts and to actual HICP infl ation in the post-crisis period, which suggests that infl ation 
expectations in the euro area have shown some signs of de-anchoring.
36   See, for example, Coibion and Gorodnishenko (2013), ECB (2015), Badel and McGillicuddy (2015), Elliot et al. (2015), 
Sussman and Zohar (2015), IMF (2016b). Kumar et al. (2015), for the case of New Zealand, indicate that business’s 
price expectations are somewhat loosely anchored and respond mainly to developments in oil prices.
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particularly the case in economies experiencing slow growth, infl ation rates persistently below 
targets and with policy interest rates close to the zero lower bound, like the US or the euro 
area, where long-term expectations seemed more fi rmly anchored than in some other countries 
such as Japan.37 All this might indicate looser anchoring of expectations and possible second-
round effects, which would be a matter of concern for monetary authorities. 
Following the monetary policy decisions adopted in different areas in the last two years, 
long-term infl ation expectations picked up again (ECB, 2015), at least temporarily, but they have 
remained volatile and below infl ation targets, which could indicate that markets are anticipating 
37   As highlighted by Clark and Davig (2008), Beechey et al. (2011) and Autrup and Grothe (2014), for instance. The recent 
“Comprehensive Assessment” of the Quantitative and Qualitative Easing strategy by the Bank of Japan points to the 
adaptive character of infl ation expectations as one of the main determinants of persistently very low infl ation in Japan 
(Bank of Japan, 2016).
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low infl ation rates for a long time (Yellen, 2015). A recent study by the IMF has found that 
the coeffi cient of forward-looking infl ation expectations estimated in a hybrid new Keynesian 
Phillips curve has diminished since the crisis, while the persistence of infl ation (the coeffi cient of 
lagged infl ation capturing the backward-looking component of expectations) has increased (IMF, 
2016b), especially for countries at the effective lower bound. 
3.5 Empirical analysis of the factors determining inflation
The ultra-low infl ation seen during the recent recovery has surprised both economic analysts 
and central banks, and numerous studies have been published analysing the role of various 
different factors in explaining why infl ation is behaving in this way.38 Most of these studies fi nd 
that a large part of the decline in headline infl ation can be attributed to transitory factors, such 
as lower energy prices, economic slack (both at the domestic and global level) and, in some 
cases, the effect of exchange rate movements. On the other hand, they usually fi nd a wide 
degree of variation between countries in terms of the role of cyclical sensitivity and the relevance 
of forward-looking infl ation expectations (whereas over recent decades the coeffi cient of slack 
has been declining gradually whilst the anchoring of infl ation expectations has become more 
relevant). Nevertheless, overall, these studies are still unable to explain the recent decline in core 
infl ation satisfactorily (not only due to heterogeneity alluded to above, but also to the lack of 
robust estimates of Phillips curves). 
In our empirical exercise, we concentrated on the more recent period to try to discern 
whether there has been a change in the relative importance of those factors, based on the 
estimation of core infl ation through a standard Phillips curve for 21 advanced economies.39 In this 
specifi cation, core CPI infl ation ( measured at quarterly annualised rates, is determined by 
infl ation expectations – a combination of forward looking and backward looking elements –, 
the degree of cyclical slack and the role of import prices (the relative infl ation of imports over 
consumer prices): 
π t = LT t + (1 – ) π’ t +  1 slack t + 2 imp t +  t
As in Ball and Mazumder (2011), the forward looking element of infl ation expectations 
(LT t ) captures long term infl ation expectations, measured by the Consensus forecast or proxied 
by the central bank targets, while the backward looking component (π’ t ) is constructed as the 
average core infl ation rate of the last four quarters.40 The degree of economic slack in each 
economy (slack t ) is proxied by the output gap (the difference between actual and potential GDP 
divided by potential output) or the unemployment gap (the difference between the unemployment 
rate and estimated NAIRU). Relative import prices (imp t ) are measured in domestic currency, 
38   See, for instance, Banco de España (2015), BIS (2015), Blanchard et al. (2015), Carney (2015), Constâncio (2015), 
Fischer (2015), Forbes (2015), Jordan (2015), Kiley (2015), Yellen (2015), IMF (2016b).
39   Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, the euro area, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and 
the United States. 
40   The sum of the coeffi cients of forward- and backward-looking infl ation expectations is restricted to 1 in order to 
guarantee that the Phillips curve is vertical in the long run.
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to capture trends in prices of imported goods and services, as well as the effect of exchange 
rates.41 The variables for slack and relative import prices are included contemporarily or 
lagged by one period, depending on which specifi cation fi ts the data better. Finally, we 
added a dummy variable to account for VAT changes. (Defi nitions and sources can be found 
in Appendix A.)
For each country in the sample we estimate the previous relation by OLS42 for 
two periods: before the crisis, from 199743 to 2007, and after the crisis, from 2008 to 
2015. Chart 12 reports the main results, in terms of changes in the coeffi cients of the 
Phillips curve between both periods, which, similarly to other studies show a wide degree 
41   Another variable typically used in the literature to capture global factors affecting infl ation is the global output gap. We 
tried this variable (the OECD output gap) in our regressions, but it showed a high correlation with domestic output 
gaps and its coeffi cient was not signifi cant.
42   Estimation methods vary depending on the empirical approach and the defi nition of variables. Some authors (e.g., 
Blanchard et al. 2015) estimate jointly the evolution of infl ation and the NAIRU (or potential output) obtaining time 
varying coeffi cients by applying the Kalman fi lter. Other studies, along the new Keynesian spirit, use the infl ation rate 
in period t+1 as the forward-looking component of infl ation expectations and estimate by GMM, but this approach 
is subject to critiques due to the weakness of instruments. In line with studies such as Ball and Mazumder (2011) or 
Banco de España (2015), we use long-term infl ation forecasts from Consensus or the central bank target which allow 
estimation by OLS for each country. Panel data settings are not considered due to the specifi c behaviour of infl ation 
in each country.
43  First quarter of 1999 for the euro area.
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SOURCE: Own elaboration. X-axis before the crisis, Y-axis after the crisis.
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of variation between countries; for some of them the results are not robust to alternative 
specifi cations of the slack – the output gap or the unemployment gap – or the backward-
looking infl ation expectations – different number of lags, for instance – (see Appendix B).
In the case of infl ation expectations, for some countries (Australia, Austria, Finland, 
the Netherlands, Norway, Ireland, Italy, the United Kingdom, and the United States), we 
fi nd an increase in the relative role of the forward-looking component of expectations in 
the most recent period, although only in Italy and Finland is there a statistically signifi cant 
difference between the coeffi cient in the two periods. For other countries it appears that 
the backward-looking component has increased (Canada, Denmark, the euro area, France, 
Germany, Japan, New Zealand, Portugal, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland), 
although this change is not statistically signifi cant in a robust way in any of them. 
Regarding the cyclical sensitivity of infl ation, in line with other studies, there is also 
a high degree of heterogeneity. For some countries (Australia, Belgium, Canada, Finland, 
Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom), we fi nd an increase 
in the coeffi cient of slack in the most recent period, while this is not the case in others 
(Austria, Denmark, the euro area, France, Germany, New Zealand, Norway, Japan, Portugal, 
Switzerland, and the United States). Again, most of these results are not simultaneously 
statistically signifi cant and robust (except for Australia, Canada, Italy and Portugal). 
Finally, the role of relative import prices on infl ation varies also across countries. For 
some of them (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, the euro area, Germany Ireland, Japan, Norway, 
Portugal, Spain, South Korea and Switzerland) there is an increase in the coeffi cient, whereas 
for others (Australia, France, Finland, Italy, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Sweden, the 
United Kingdom and the United States) we observe a decrease. These results seem robust 
and statistically signifi cant for a larger number of countries (Denmark, the euro area, France, 
New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States). 
Given the high degree of heterogeneity and lack of robustness of these results, 
instead of drawing general conclusions, we have tried to infer which factors might explain 
recent infl ation trends in specifi c countries. In Chart 13 we show the contribution of each 
factor to the year-on-year core infl ation rate for the United States and the United Kingdom 
(in Appendix C we show the breakdown of infl ation for the rest of countries). 
In the United States, forward-looking expectations seem to have taken on a more 
prominent role post-2008, while cyclical slack contributed to the decline in core infl ation, 
although less powerfully since 2011. According to these estimates, if slack continues to 
diminish and long-term infl ation expectations are well anchored, core infl ation in the US 
should converge towards the Federal Reserve’s infl ation target. 
In the United Kingdom, the forward-looking component of infl ation expectations 
also seems to have become more relevant since the crisis, but the coeffi cient of slack is not 
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found to be signifi cant (and has the opposite sign), and a large part of the recent decline in 
infl ation remains unexplained. In some countries – and keeping in mind the general lack of 
robustness of the results – the post-crisis decline in infl ation is related to backward-looking 
infl ation expectations taking on a more central role (the euro area, France, Germany, Japan, 
New Zealand, Portugal, South Korea and Sweden); in other cases, which show forward-
looking infl ation expectations having a more important role, economic slack is more important 
in explaining ultra-low core infl ation (Australia Finland, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands and 
Spain) (see Appendix C). The relevance of import prices is relatively minor, except in the case 
of some euro area countries. 
DECOMPOSITION OF CORE INFLATION IN THE US AND THE UK CHART 13
SOURCE: Own elaboration.
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4 Implications of low inflation
4.1 Adverse economic effects of low inflation 
Even if low infl ation is the result of positive supply shocks, a context of excessively low infl ation poses 
various risks. First of all, ultra-low infl ation rates raise real interest rates, tightening monetary and 
fi nancial conditions and weakening demand [Akerlof et al. (1996)]. In a recent study looking at the 
case of Sweden, Svensson (2015) estimates that, even with infl ation expectations fi rmly anchored 
on the central bank’s target, the effect of sub-target infl ation has a cost in terms of unemployment.44 
Low infl ation also infl uences inequality: according to a recent study by Adam and Zhu (2015), an 
unexpected drop in prices increases the inequality in household wealth in the euro area, with younger 
middle class cohorts losing more, and older, wealthier households benefi ting more.
Moreover, in the current context of high public and private debt in many countries, 
lower infl ation makes deleveraging harder, as it reduces economic agents’ nominal incomes 
[Yellen (2015), IMF (2016c)]. The channels through which lower infl ation affects debt dynamics 
are diverse [for the classic treatment of the subject, see Fisher (1933)]. On the one hand, lower 
infl ation reduces nominal GDP growth (to the extent that it is refl ected in the GDP defl ator), 
causing an automatic increase in the debt-to-GDP ratio [End et al. (2015)]. The paradigmatic 
case is that of Japan, where falling prices since the 1990s have accounted for a third of the over 
100 pp increase in public debt since then. Moreover, the possible adverse effect of excessively 
low infl ation on GDP growth would also worsen debt dynamics [Neri and Notarpietro (2014)]. 
Slower growth of prices and wages also has implications for both the public and private sectors’ 
income available to meet debt servicing requirements. Lastly, in an environment of policy rates 
close to the lower bound, a drop in infl ation cannot be accompanied by a proportional lowering 
of interest rates, which under normal circumstances would compensate for the higher debt ratio. 
Similarly, a generalised drop in infl ation can hinder macrofi nancial adjustment and 
improvements to competitiveness in those countries belonging to a monetary area. This may force 
them to undergo a process of internal devaluation, as lower infl ation across the area would oblige 
them to register even smaller – possibly negative – price and wage increases, which are more diffi cult 
to achieve in the presence of downward rigidities. This could potentially lead to a sharper adjustment 
through unemployment [Banco de España (2015), Kuvshinov et al. (2015), Yellen (2015)]. 
The most harmful consequences of low infl ation occur if it turns into defl ation, particularly 
if this is persistent and accompanied by a de-anchoring of infl ation expectations, as this can cause 
a drop in spending and a sharp economic slowdown.45 Defl ationary situations may be due to either 
supply or demand shocks. However, regardless of the origin, defl ationary processes are rarely 
44   Svensson estimates that with infl ation 0.6 pp below target between 1997 and 2011 the unemployment rate was 
raised by 0.8 pp
45   See, for example, Ahearne et al. (2002), Bernanke (2002), Buiter (2003), Kumar et al. (2003), Ito and Mishkin (2006), ECB 
(2012), Ehrmann (2014), Busetti et al. (2014), Bunn et al. (2015), Carney (2015), D’Acunto et al (2015), Nakazono (2016). 
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benign.46 They cause a redistribution of income from debtors to creditors, incentives for credit 
intermediation are undermined by the loss of value of assets used for collateral, and if defl ation 
persists, there is a tendency to fall into a spiral of lower prices, output, profi ts, and employment. 
Finally, an environment of excessively low infl ation, or even worse, a defl ationary 
process, may undermine central banks’ credibility and limit their ability to implement counter-
cyclical monetary policy [Ahearne et al. (2002), Yellen (2015)]. An environment in which interest 
rates are close to the effective lower bound further complicates matters, and a multiplicity of 
equilibrium situations may arise [Aruoba and Schorfheide (2015)]. The following section looks at 
the various challenges low infl ation poses for economic policy, and monetary policy in particular, 
pointing out several policy alternatives that have been put forward in the literature. 
4.2 Economic policy implications
Central banks in the developed economies have responded to the environment of moderate 
economic growth and low infl ation in recent years by trying to stimulate aggregate demand. 
Policy interest rates have remained close to zero in the United States, the United Kingdom, Japan 
and the euro area for over eight years. Indeed, more recently, offi cial deposit rates have been 
brought below zero in some cases (Denmark the euro area, Japan, Sweden and Switzerland). 
Additionally central banks have adopted a series of unconventional monetary policy measures 
that have added extra stimulus, such as expanding their balance sheets by buying fi nancial 
assets, or pursuing a policy of forward guidance to steer expectations regarding future monetary 
policy decisions. According to traditional instruments for measuring the degree of monetary 
policy easing, such as the Taylor rule, monetary policy has been highly accommodative in most 
developed economies. Therefore, notwithstanding the lags with which monetary policy operates, 
these policies should have resulted in higher infl ation.
However, assessing the degree of monetary accommodation has become more diffi cult 
after the global fi nancial crisis. The natural real interest rate, one of the key parameters of the 
Taylor rule, has dropped [Laubach and Williams (2015), Pescatori and Turunen (2015)] and there 
is considerable uncertainty about how it will evolve over the next few years [Hernando et al. 
(2015), Rachel and Smith (2015)]. As mentioned in previous sections, there are serious doubts 
about economies’ true cyclical slack (measured either via the output gap or unemployment 
rates), a variable also included in the Taylor rule. Furthermore, certain cyclical and structural 
characteristics – such as ageing, that increase the share of the population that is less sensitive 
to changes in interest rates [Imam (2013), IMF (2013)] – may have reduced the effectiveness 
of monetary policy. Moreover, given the fl attening of the Phillips curve, central banks can only 
achieve their targets with more aggressive policies.47
46   However, for some authors, mainly those associated with the BIS, the historical evidence shows that not all defl ationary 
episodes are harmful, particularly in the case of those that result from positive supply shocks. See, for example, 
Atkeson and Kehoe (2004), Bordo and Redish (2004), Borio and Filardo (2004), Bordo and Filardo (2005), BIS (2015), 
Borio et al. (2015). Arias et al. (2015), for their part, indicate that the harmful effects of low infl ation crucially derive 
from its origin, and the ability of monetary policy to respond. The effects are more positive if defl ation is due to positive 
supply shocks and monetary policy is not limited by the effective lower bound.
47  The same thing could happen when trying to control infl ation when it starts to rise.
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The inability of central banks to control long-term infl ation and provide a nominal anchor 
to the economy can have consequences for risk premia. Evidence of this can be found in the 
shifts experienced by medium- and long-term infl ation swaps and the infl ation expectations 
deriving from them, which should not have moved with oil prices, as over this time frame their 
effects should have disappeared.
Moreover, recent experience has heightened central banks’ concerns that the effective 
lower bound on interest rates may become a constraint again [Buiter and Rahbari (2015), Yellen 
(2016)], so that any shock could put the economy into an unfavourable equilibrium of low growth 
and infl ation, with the space for monetary policy basically limited to unconventional measures 
[Bullard (2013), Reifschneider (2016)]. Monetary authorities are pondering whether the risks 
of an early normalisation of monetary policy in this context would not be greater than those 
of a delayed normalisation [Evans et al. (2015)], as the possibilities of stimulating growth and 
employment would be limited, while there are a variety of tools to control infl ationary pressures. 
This is all set in an international context in which the risks are still predominantly on the downside 
for both activity and infl ation, and where the experience of other central banks in recent years 
(Canada, the ECB, Norway and Sweden) has shown that when they have opted to raise policy 
interest rates, they have had to subsequently cut them again.
In order to obtain more leeway for action and to reduce the probability of reaching the 
lower bound of policy interest rates in periods of low infl ation following adverse shocks, some 
authors, such as Williams (2009, 2016), Blanchard et al. (2010) and Ball (2014) have suggested 
that central banks should raise their infl ation targets, which would imply a higher average level of 
interest rates. In this regard, it is worth noting that the 2% target (the predominant target set in 
the developed economies) is the outcome of weighing up the effi ciency costs of positive infl ation 
rates (e.g. distortions in fl uctuations in relative prices and increased uncertainty), against the 
costs associated with zero infl ation, such as the downward rigidity of nominal wages and the 
possibility of reaching the effective lower bound [Bernanke (2002)]. Central banks considered 
that the probability of reaching the effective lower bound with the 2% infl ation target was small.48 
This view may have changed since 2008, partly as a result of falling natural real interest rates 
[Chung et al. (2012), Canzoneri et al. (2015)]. Some analysts [e.g. Chung et al. (2012)] therefore 
argue that the infl ation target should depend on the natural real interest rate. Opponents of an 
increase in the infl ation target argue that once the nominal anchor has been altered it may prove 
diffi cult and costly to anchor it at its new level, and that the change could undermine its credibility.
Other authors have proposed that infl ation targeting be replaced by a fl exible price 
level (Hatcher and Minford (2014) and the references therein) or nominal GDP [Woodford (2013); 
Williams (2016)] targeting. In these frameworks, the central bank targets a steadily growing level 
of prices or nominal GDP, rather than the rate of infl ation, automatically delivering the “lower for 
longer” policy prescription the situation calls for [Eggertsson and Woodford (2003)].
48   Reifschneider and Williams (2000) found that with a 2% infl ation target monetary policy would be constrained by the 
effective lower bound only 5% of the time and that these episodes would have an average duration of a year.
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Other authors have proposed avoiding the effective lower bound on policy interest rates 
by imposing a negative interest rate on physical cash [Haldane (2015)]. A series of options have 
been considered along these lines, such as: randomly eliminating banknotes based on their 
serial number [Mankiw (2009)], abolishing physical currency [Rogoff (2014, 2016)] or setting 
an explicit exchange rate between physical cash and electronic money [Agarwal and Kimball 
(2015)]. However, these proposals raise a number of logistic and behavioural issues. Therefore, 
if we accept that the effective lower bound will re-emerge as a constraint in the future, it will be 
necessary to deploy unconventional monetary policy measures – forward guidance and asset 
purchase operations – to stimulate demand and infl ation [see, for example, Engel et al. (2015)]. 
Apart from the fact that asset purchases may be considered quasi-fi scal policy in some ways, 
they have expanded central banks’ balance sheets considerably, but not stimulated private credit 
growth, which has led to an increase in excess bank reserves. In other words, the monetary 
base has expanded considerably, but the money supply has not. Bank lending surveys indicate 
that it is more of a problem on the demand side than the supply side (i.e. the banks’ situation is 
not that unfavourable). 
For this reason, some academics and analysts [Bernanke (2003), Turner (2013, 2015)]
have suggested the possibility of introducing a fi scal stimulus fi nanced with permanent increases 
in the amount of money (“overt monetary fi nancing” or “helicopter money”). This stimulates 
demand by reducing taxes or by raising public spending, without increasing public debt. It is 
a more direct and effective channel than the previous monetary policy actions as it does not 
operate by cheapening lending to agents with unutilised borrowing capacity (public sector and 
businesses, as investment growth has been sluggish). Its proponents argue that the increase 
in the public defi cit is monetised and that there are no Ricardian effects on consumption and 
investment decisions, as future taxes will not have to rise and the ratio of public debt would 
decrease as nominal expenditure increases. The big risk of this proposal is that economic 
agents might come to believe that it will be repeated in the future, generating expectations of 
more infl ation, and thus neutralising its potential positive effect on aggregate demand. It should 
be recalled that, as Sargent and Wallace (1981) showed, in the long term, monetary policy 
determines the general price level provided that fi scal policy guarantees the sustainability of 
public fi nances. Therefore, monetising the debt ends up translating into a situation of fi scal 
dominance. Even if the central bank pursues a monetary policy aimed at price stability, a lack of 
fi scal discipline will drive future infl ationary processes.
Going beyond monetary policy, other policies may, in theory, help tackle low infl ation. 
First of all, as mentioned above, fi scal policy might be considered, given governments’ low 
borrowing costs. However, in the light of current high public debt-to-GDP ratios and concerns 
about long-run fi scal sustainability, some countries have limited scope for borrowing. Another 
possibility is to lower the exchange rate, but it is not possible for every country to simultaneously 
bring about infl ation by depreciating its currency as this is a zero-sum game [Carney (2016)]. 
As regards incomes policy, real wages are a relative price that is affected by exogenous factors, 
such as the labour cost of producing tradable goods in other countries, for example. Infl ationary 
pressures on the wage front will only arise when demand exceeds supply in the labour market 
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and real wage increases exceed productivity increases. Moreover, given the rise in profi ts as a 
share of GDP in recent years, wage increases may be accommodated without giving rise to wage 
pressure for some time. Structural policies may be a useful way of facilitating the reallocation 
of resources and raising economic agents’ confi dence so as to boost demand. At the same 
time, these policies would increase the natural real interest rate. Macroprudential policy has 
an important role to play in a long-lasting scenario of low interest rates, given the possibility of 
vulnerabilities building up that could derail the expansion and deepen the subsequent recession. 
Lastly, international coordination of policies, as called for by institutions such as the IMF (2016a), 
Gaspar et al. (2016) and OECD (2016), is crucial.
As discussed above, another much more worrying situation than the persistence of low 
infl ation, and one which has different implications for economic policy, would be defl ation, which 
is defi ned as a persistent and widespread drop in price levels. In this regard, the lessons learned 
about defl ation are: (i) it can become established very quickly; (ii) it can impose severe economic 
costs, unless it derives from a permanent positive supply shock (e.g. an increase in productivity); 
and (iii) vigorous and determined policies can make a rapid and decisive difference. Experience 
shows that it is essential that the authorities demonstrate they are fully ready to tackle defl ation 
and that they are willing to take all the necessary measures to raise prices in the future as well 
as today [Eggertsson and Woodford (2003)]. Given the costs involved, it is also essential that 
defl ationary risks be addressed in a forward-looking way, i.e. before they become established. 
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5 Concluding remarks
In a context of a weak economic recovery accompanied by accommodative monetary policies, 
falling infl ation rates in advanced economies may be due to transient factors – such as the 
slump in commodity prices or the effects of exchange-rate fl uctuations – or to structural shifts 
in the price and wage setting process – such as shifts in the cyclical sensitivity of infl ation to 
economic slack or in the relevance of forward-looking infl ation expectations. These factors could 
also explain the infl ation rate’s surprising reluctance to drop in the immediate aftermath of the 
global fi nancial crisis. Unfortunately, the empirical results in recent studies – including those in 
this paper – are insuffi ciently consistent or robust to prove the existence of structural changes 
in the parameters of the Phillips curve. Although we cannot explain the recent trend in infl ation 
in a completely satisfactory way, in some cases the recent drop in infl ation might tentatively be 
ascribed to backward-looking infl ation expectations playing a more important role, which could 
pose important challenges for central banks. 
The lack of defi nite conclusions stemming from our estimated Phillips curves could 
simply refl ect a misspecifi cation of the model. For instance, there may be global factors depressing 
infl ation rates that are perhaps are not adequately represented by the import prices included in 
the regressions. It could also be related to the diffi culty of measuring the relevant variables (slack 
in the economy or the labour market). More worryingly, it could constitute a genuine failure of this 
type of model to explain infl ation, something which deserves further investigation. In any case, 
any of these explanations would have serious implications for policymakers in that infl ation may 
become more diffi cult to control. 
We have also discussed how ultra-low infl ation over an extended period can have 
adverse effects on the real economy, as it raises real interest rates, hampers public and private 
deleveraging, and hinders competitiveness adjustments in those monetary-union countries that 
are obliged to resort to internal devaluation. In the most extreme case, in which there is a de-
anchoring of infl ation expectations, there is the concomitant risk of slipping into a defl ationary 
spiral, the consequences of which would be far worse still. In any event, the credibility of central 
banks’ targets may be undermined if infl ation rates fail to meet them for an extended period.
Against this backdrop, having reached the 0% lower bound for policy interest rates, 
monetary policy sought to become more expansionary by resorting to unconventional measures. 
And more recently, several central banks in developed economies (including the ECB and the Bank 
of Japan) crossed this 0% bound by setting negative interest rates on banks’ reserves deposited 
with them, intensifying the debate on the scope for action and the marginal effectiveness and 
risks of monetary policies. This is an important debate as the lower equilibrium real interest rate 
suggests that in the future monetary policy may fi nd itself in similar circumstances to today more 
often and for longer than in the past. In this scenario, support from other types of policies, such 
as fi scal policy or structural policies, is crucial in order to try to stimulate growth and infl ation.
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APPENDIX A. DEFINITIONS AND SOURCES OF VARIABLES
secruoSnoitinifeDelbairaV
Core CPI Annualized quarterly core 
HMk@SHNMQ@SD
Bureau of Economic Analysis (USA),  European Central Bank 
(Euro Area), Ministry of Economics (Japan), OECD Economic Outlook 
(Canada, Germany, France, Italy, Denmark, Switzerland, Norway, 
Sweden, Spain, Finland, Austria, Netherlands, Belgium, Australia, 
Korea, United Kingdom, Portugal, Ireland, 
New Zealand),Datastream
Unemployment gap The difference between the 
quarterly unemployment rate 
and the NAIRU
FRED (USA-unemployment rate), CBO (USA-NAIRU), Bank of Japan 
(Japan),OECD (Canada, Germany, France Italy, Denmark, 
Switzerland, Norway, Sweden, Spain, Finland, Austria, Netherlands, 
Belgium, Australia, Korea, Euro Area, United Kingdom, Portugal, 
Ireland, New Zealand-NAIRU), national statistics institutes (Canada, 
Germany, France Italy, Denmark, Switzerland, Norway, Sweden, 
Spain, Finland, Austria, Netherlands, Belgium, Australia, Korea, Euro 
Area, United Kingdom, Portugal, Ireland, New Zealand-unemployment 
rate), Datastream, Bloomberg
Long term expected 
HMk@SHNMQ@SD
3GDHMk@SHNMDWODBS@SHNMR
in 5-10 year or, alternatively, 
SGDNAIDBSHUDNEHMk@SHNM
of the central bank
Consensus (USA, Japan, Canada, Germany, France, Italy), Central 
Banks webpages (Denmark, Switzerland, Norway, Sweden, Spain, 
Finland, Austria, Netherlands, Belgium, Australia, Korea, Euro Area, 
United Kingdom, Portugal, Ireland, New Zealand)
Core import prices Annualized quarterly import 
prices rate – excluding fuel –
Bureau of Economic Analysis (USA), European Central Bank 
(Euro Area), ONS (United Kingdom), Minisitry of Economics (Japan), 
Oxford Economics (Canada, Germany, France, Italy, Denmark, 
Switzerland, Norway, Sweden, Spain, Finland, Austria, Netherlands, 
Belgium, Australia, Korea, Portugal, Ireland, New Zealand), 
own calculations
Output gap The difference between actual 
and potential GDP as a 
percentage of potential GDP
FRED (USA), Bank of Japan (Japan), Oxford Economics 
(Euro Area, United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, Denmark, 
Switzerland, Norway, Sweden, Korea, Germany, France, Italy, 
Spain, Ireland, Finland, Portugal, Austria, Netherlands, Belgium),
WEO (New Zealand)
DEFINITIONS AND SOURCES OF VARIABLES ANNEX A
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APPENDIX B. ROBUSTNESS TESTS
CHANGING THE UNEMPLOYMENT GAP BY THE OUTPUT GAP
SOURCE: Own elaboration. 
NOTE: X-axis before the crisis, Y-axis after the crisis.
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CHANGES IN THE COEFFICIENTS OF THE PHILLIPS CURVE
SOURCE: Own elaboration. X-axis before the crisis, Y-axis after the crisis.
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CHANGES IN THE COEFFICIENTS OF THE PHILLIPS CURVE ANNEX B.3
SOURCE: Own elaboration. X-axis before the crisis, Y-axis after the crisis.
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APPENDIX C. BREAKDOWN OF INFLATION ACCORDING TO THE BASELINE MODEL
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SOURCE: Own elaboration.
All the period Precrisis Postcrisis
0.575 0.498 0.991
(0.129) (0.155) (0.298)
0.425 0.502 0.009
(0.129) (0.155) (0.298)
-0.121 -0.293 -0.194
(0.050) (0.098) (0.087)
0.028 0.054 0.008
(0.015) (0.016) (0.022)
R squared 0.200 0.232 0.290
Slack
Core import
prices growth
DUM1
DUM2
DUM3
Long term
expectations
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expectations
All the period Precrisis Postcrisis
R squared
0.246 0.299 0.136
(0.105) (0.135) (0.163)
0.754 0.701 0.864
(0.105) (0.135) (0.163)
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(0.012) (0.019) (0.008)
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486.0323.0613.0
)013.0()052.0()071.0(
613.0776.0486.0
)013.0()052.0()071.0(
840.0203.0501.0
)661.0()263.0()261.0(
720.0-920.0900.0
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314.2350.2
)281.0()981.0(
490.1-434.1-
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070.1529.0
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544.0861.0802.0
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SOURCE: Own elaboration.
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SOURCE: Own elaboration.
Slack
Core import
prices growth
DUM1
DUM2
DUM3
Long term
expectations
Bacwards
expectations
All the period Precrisis Postcrisis
All the period Precrisis Postcrisis
R squared
R squared
R squared
Slack
Core import
prices growth
DUM1
DUM2
DUM3
Long term
expectations
Bacwards
expectations
All the period Precrisis Postcrisis
Slack
Core import
prices growth
DUM1
DUM2
DUM3
Long term
expectations
Bacwards
expectations
796.0133.1159.0
)912.0()582.0()471.0(
303.0133.0-940.0
)912.0()582.0()471.0(
274.0-375.0-544.0-
)641.0()121.0()180.0(
810.0-350.0-230.0-
)710.0()020.0()510.0(
692.1045.1
)861.0()201.0(
332.0815.0073.0
221.0261.0871.0
)771.0()211.0()601.0(
878.0838.0228.0
)771.0()211.0()601.0(
851.0-084.0-782.0-
)861.0()621.0()901.0(
420.0-040.0700.0
)030.0()420.0()020.0(
535.0307.0
)591.0()641.0(
670.0643.0331.0
010.1911.0663.0
(0.155) (0.230) (0.260)
010.0-188.0436.0
(0.155) (0.230) (0.260)
-0.132 -0.037 -0.288
(0.050) (0.095) (0.074)
520.0430.0320.0
(0.023) (0.054) (0.018)
950.0-890.0-
)861.0()761.0(
877.2717.2
)960.0()290.0(
275.0940.0962.0
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 53 DOCUMENTO OCASIONAL N.º 1608
LONG TERM BACKWARD SLACK
IMPORT INFLATION
LONG TERM BACKWARD SLACK
IMPORT INFLATION
LONG TERM BACKWARD SLACK
IMPORT INFLATION
16  SPAIN
-2.0
-1.0
0.0
1.0
2.0
3.0
4.0
5.0
2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
% y-o-y and p.p.
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
3.5
2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
% y-o-y and p.p.
17  FINLAND
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
3.5
2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
% y-o-y and p.p.
18  AUSTRIA
SOURCE: Own elaboration.
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SOURCE: Own elaboration.
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